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NOTES
TREATMENT OF THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
INTRODUCTION
Much attention has been given recently to the Supreme Court's
handling of the priority of the federal tax lien' vis-a-vis various state
created liens.2 Under the judicially developed inchoate lien doctrine the
Court has held that the federal tax lien will have priority over certain liens
which have arisen prior to it in time and which are sufficiently perfected
under state law to have priority over any subsequent interests, but which
are inchoate, or unperfected under the Court's stricter standards.3 Bank-
ruptcy proceedings are said not to affect the order of lien priorities.4 Specific
sections of the Bankruptcy Act 5 may affect the validity of certain liens as
against the trustee in bankruptcy, or may subordinate certain statutory
liens to non-lien claims.7 However as among various liens the act does
not specify an order of priority, and they will take in bankruptcy similarly
as in a non-bankruptcy case.8 Since part of the law determining lien
priority is the inchoate lien doctrine with its federal priority, it would ap-
pear at first glance that this doctrine should apply as well in bankruptcy
proceedings as out. Recently the Second Circuit reviewing a bankruptcy
distribution order held a federal tax lien prior to an antecedent but inchoate
state tax lien which was valid in bankruptcy as against the trustee.9 The
1 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321-3.
2 A few of the many recent articles dealing with this problem include: Cross,
Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collection,
27 FORDHAm L. REv. 1 (1958); Felton, What the Supreme Court Says About the
Federal Tax Lien, 37 TAXES 45 (1959); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien
Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 459 (1958) ; Prather, Federal Liens as They Affect Mort-
gage Lending, 13 Bus. LAw. 118 (1957); Panel Discussion, Dangers Under Recent
Federal Tax Lien Decisions, 14 Bus. LAw. 12 (1958); 33 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 157
(1958). Amendatory legislation was presented by a committee of the ABA to the
Feb. 23, 1959 mid-year meeting of the House of Delegates, and approved, 45 A.B.A.J.
362 (1959).
3 See notes 24-37 infra and accompanying text.
4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 67.27[3], 70.70 (14th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as
COLLIER].
552 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1958), as amended
[hereinafter cited to specific sections of the Bankruptcy Act only].
6 Sections 60b, 67a, 67c(2), 70c.
7 Section 67c(1).
8 See 4 COLLIER §§ 67.27[3], 70.70.
9 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958).
This court held not only that the state tax lien as inchoate was to be paid after the
temporally subsequent federal tax lien, it held also that the state lien should share
pro rata under § 64a (4) with the non-lien federal tax claims. This goes beyond any
of the Supreme Court cases holding the federal lien prior to an inchoate lien. See
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authorities cited were those Supreme Court cases granting the federal lien
priority in situations not involving bankruptcy; 'o in fact, the inchoate lien
doctrine has heretofore been developed exclusively in non-bankruptcy
decisions. There appear good reasons for questioning whether this doctrine
should be applied in bankruptcy proceedings; at the least, the circuit court
has not made a considered use of the authorities. Before engrafting this
judicial doctrine onto the explicit statutory provisions, it would seem that
the courts should examine the doctrine in terms of the policies controlling
bankruptcy liquidation itself. This Note, then, will attempt to analyze
whether the inchoate lien doctrine should be applied to determine the
priority of the federal tax lien in bankruptcy.
THE INCHOATE LIEN DOCTRINE
The inchoate lien doctrine was originally developed by the Supreme
Court under section 3466 of the Revised Statutes which gives the United
States a first priority in specified insolvency liquidations, but not in bank-
ruptcy.11 The section does not create a lien, 2 but in a series of cases start-
ing with Spokane County v. United Statesm3 the Court held that the United
States, even without lien status, was to receive payment before certain
liens which arose prior to the start of the liquidation proceedings, the date
at which the federal priority attaches, but which liens were not "perfected"
by this date. The Court's test of perfection requires certainty as to the
identity of the lienor, the amount of the lien, and the property to which it
attaches.' 4 Adequate perfection to defeat the federal priority may also
require the debtor to be "divested . . of either title or possession" by
the lienor.15 The cases have subordinated to the federal priority a local tax
notes 23-37 infra and accompanying text. Rather the court apparently applies the
inchoate lien doctrine of REv. STAT. § 3466 so that a state lien will not take its share
prior to a federal non-lien claim. See notes 11-20 infra and accompanying text.
However it appears that without a lien a federal claim should not defeat a state lien
in bankruptcy, § 3466 being inapplicable in bankruptcy in this context. See notes
43-51 infra and accompanying text.
' United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954) ; United States v.
Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
i"Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent, or whenever
the estate of any deceased debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators, is
insufficient to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the United
States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to
cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a
voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding,
concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an
act of bankruptcy is committed." REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952).
The section does not apply on mere insolvency of a debtor of the United States, but
only in those situations named and where the debtor's estate is being administered by
a third person. 4 CoLLIER § 67.24[2], at 263, nA6. See also note 44 infra.
12 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1804) ; United States v.
O'Dell, 160 F.2d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1947).
Is279 U.S. 80 (1929).
"Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
ISUnited States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953).
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lien assessed against personal property but not specific property, 16 a state
tax lien which was not liquidated in amount,17 and a state tax lien which
attached to property which was not constant.' s A statutory landlord's lien
has gone down before the federal priority since the lien did not cover
specific property,19 and it has been held that recording of a lien will not
defeat the section 3466 priority where the lien is not otherwise specific by
the Court's test.20 In every case decided by the Supreme Court in a 3466
situation, under the facts presented the competing lien has always been
found to be inchoate. The Supreme Court has reserved the question as to
the result under the statute should a lien be held to be choate,2 1 but circuit
court cases have held that choate interests will avoid the federal priority.=
The inchoate lien doctrine may be a justifiable protection of federal
revenues from state interference resulting from the granting of premature
lien status. The priority statute making the United States a first claimant,
if it means anything, must make the United States first at least as to non-
lien claimants. For a lien to defeat this congressional directive that the
United States should be first, it is not unreasonable to demand that it must
be fixed at least in those attributes typically associated with a lien.
In 1950, the inchoate lien doctrine was judicially incorporated by the
Supreme Court into the federal tax lien statute.23 The Internal Revenue
Code merely creates a lien in favor of the United States 24 which arises at
the time an assessment is made against a taxpayer.25 The Code does not
specify the priority of this lien. In United States v. Security Trust &
Savings Bank,2 6 the issue was presented of the priority as between such a
federal tax lien and the lien of a creditor who had attached the debtor-
taxpayer's property at the commencement of his suit prior to the date the
1' Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
17 New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290 (1933).
1s United States v. Texas, 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
'" United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
20 Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362 (1946).
21 New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933).
22 Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1957)
(chattel mortgage); United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1954) (perfected ad valorem tax lien).
23 For more complete discussion of the development of the inchoate lien doctrine,
and of the incorporation of the doctrine into the federal tax lien, see Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of the Federal Govermtent: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate
and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, 63 YALE
L.J. 905]; Reeve, The Relative Priority of Government and Private Liens, 29 Rocn"
MT. L. REv. 167 (1957); Comment, 54 Micn. L. REv. 829 (1956). For a criticism
of the way in which the Supreme Court has disposed of the cases by summary dis-
position, see Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77 (1958).
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
2-5 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6322. Assessment is an internal administrative act.
Recording is not necessary to create the lien, but only to maintain its validity against
certain subsequent interests. See § 6323, and see notes 38-42 infra and accompanying
text.
26340 U.S. 47 (1950). This was a lien enforcement action not subject to the
terms of § 3466 since it was not a total liquidation of an insolvent's property.
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federal tax lien arose,27 but who had not obtained judgment until after that
date. The attachment lien would apparently have prevailed against any
temporally subsequent interests at state law.28 In granting priority to the
federal lien, the Court drew an analogy to the earlier cases involving priority
under section 3466.
"In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority under
R.S. § 3466, it has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal prior-
ity merely to show a lien effective to protect the lienor against others
than the Government, but contingent upon taking subsequent steps for
enforcing it. . .. If the purpose of the federal tax lien statute to
insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the United States
from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail
here." 2
The rationale then appears to be that since the non-federal lien was inchoate
and would be subject to a section 3466 priority, a federal tax lien should
fare no worse than a mere priority claim. ° The analogy between the
federal tax lien statute and section 3466 does not appear to be so strong as
to have compelled the result reached in Security Bank. The apparent dis-
tinction is that section 3466 provides for liquidation proceedings of all of
an insolvent's property, whereas the tax lien has effect only in liquidations
of specific property, whether the taxpayer is insolvent or not. However,
the Court has been consistent in applying the inchoate lien doctrine in tax
lien cases, and has subsequently held a garnishment lien,3 ' a landlord's
distress lien,32 and a mechanic's lien whether unrecorded 3 or recorded,3 4
not sufficiently perfected so as to have priority over a federal tax lien
later-in-time. In only one tax lien case has the Court held that an interest
so met the test of specificity of identity, amount and property as to
characterize it as choate.3 5 The case involved a lien on real estate for
taxes assessed against it; in this situation the Court held that choate liens
will take as against the federal tax lien on a first-in-time basis.36 Appar-
27 Under the 1939 Code, the lien attached when the assessment list was received
by the Collector, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 36, § 3671, 53 Stat. 449.
28 This was not stated in the case but if it were not so the issue decided by the
Court would not have been presented since the federal lien would apparently have
taken at least to the same extent as would an interest at state law.
29 340 U.S. at 51.
30 See Sarner, Correlation of Priority and Lien Rights in the Collection of Federal
Taxes, 95 U. PA. L. REv. 739, 756 (1947).
31 United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955).
3 2 United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
33 United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955).
3 1United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
35United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954). Compare United
States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), treating a local property tax
under § 3466. See Kennedy, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 929.
36 347 U.S. at 85.
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ently for choateness as against a federal lien, there is no requirement that
the debtor be divested of title or possession, as might be required in a 3466
situation.32
The federal tax lien law contains one concession to certain other in-
terests: until the federal lien is recorded it is not valid as to mortgagees,
pledgees, purchasers and judgment creditors.38 These exceptions were
added by Congress in response to a Supreme Court decision holding the
federal tax lien prior in right to one such interest even though the federal
lien was unrecorded when the interest arose.3 9 These exceptions have been
strictly construed by the Court, which has limited the favored classes to their
conventional usages.+ Further, even an interest claiming this specific pro-
tection must apparently also be choate under the Court's standard of cer-
tainty of identity, amount and property. United States v. R. F. Ball Const.
Co.4 1 involved an assignment by a subcontractor to his surety of amounts to
become due under the contract as security for any indebtedness thereafter
incurred by the subcontractor to the surety for non-performance of the con-
tract. Although characterized by the state as a mortgage and perfected
for state purposes prior to the time of filing of the federal tax lien, the
assignment was held to be inchoate since no liability was incurred until
after that date.4
APPLICABILITY OF THE INCHOATE LIEN DOCTRINE IN
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
When bankruptcy proceedings are begun, it is clear that tax claims
of the United States which do not have lien status will not be afforded
any recovery other than as granted by the Bankruptcy Act, which specifies
a fourth priority among general creditors after the payment of any liens
which are valid against the trustee.43  The priority statute and the Bank-
ruptcy Act are mutually exclusive in their application, the former only to
37 See United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953).
38 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a). There is also an exception for mortgagees,
pledgees, and purchasers of securities, even though notice of the lien has been filed.
§6323(c).
39 United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893). See Kennedy, 63 YALE L.J.
905, 920. From the mention of specific subsequent creditors in the statute, the Gov-
ernment has argued that only those interests are protected, regardless of the time
of attachment. Id. at 921, n.99. This position was approved by Mr. Justice Jackson
in United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950) (concurring
opinion). But see Brown, supra note 23, at 84: "[T]his is a considerable feat of logic,
converting a statute designed to protect subsequent encumbrancers into one overriding
the claims of prior encumbrancers."
4o United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218, 220 (1955) (landlord's distress lien not
within this exception); United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 363
(1953) (town with tax lien not judgment creditor) ; cf. United States v. White Bear
Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (mechanics' lien). For a collection of cases
involving this section, see Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1823 (1958).
41355 U.S. 587 (1958).
4- 2 Id. at 588-89 (dissenting opinion). The case is discussed in Cross, supra note 2,
at 27. See also Plumb, vipra note 2, at 475; 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 157 (1958).
4 3 Bankruptcy Act § 64a (4).
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non-bankruptcy liquidations, the latter only to bankruptcy proceedings.44
It follows that the inchoate lien doctrine as a part of the construction of
section 3466 itself will be of no benefit to non-lien claims of the United
States in bankruptcy.
The question then presents itself as to whether an inchoate lien doc-
trine might not be similarly appropriate as to this fourth position of the
United States among general creditors, i.e., will an otherwise valid non-
federal lien be placed behind the federal non-lien priority if the non-federal
lien does not satisfy the Court's standard of choateness? The same rationale
could be used to justify such a subordination as was used to justify the
original construction of the inchoate lien doctrine upon section 3466.4 5 But
closer examination of bankruptcy proceedings as a whole will show that
such an argument would be untenable. It is the trustee who in bankruptcy
proceedings challenges the perfection of asserted liens, acting for the benefit
of all general creditors 46 of whom the United States is only one. The
Bankruptcy Act itself sets out explicit standards for the determination of
the validity of liens as against general creditors; 47 it is at best doubtful if
additional judicial standards should be read into the act which as to this
point at least is quite specific. And while it may be argued that Congress
has consistently demonstrated an intention to protect tax revenues and that
therefore an inchoate lien doctrine should be judicially incorporated in
section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act to subordinate inchoate liens to ftderal
tax claims even though the latter are not secured by a lien, yet federal tax
44 See United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423 (1941), holding that the Bankruptcy
Act priority for wage claims works no implied modification of the federal priority
under § 3466 in non-bankruptcy proceedings; Guarantee Co. v. Title Guarantee Co.,
224 U.S. 152 (1912), holding that in bankruptcy the federal priority gives way to
wage claims. And see United States v. Gargill, 218 F.2d 556 (1st Cir. 1955); 4
COLLIER fr 67.24[2], at 264. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d
731 (9th Cir. 1946), provides the rationale for the exclusive nature of the Bankruptcy
Act. "It is reasonable to assume that bankruptcy proceedings are of such a specialized
nature that the Bankruptcy Act was intended to govern such a situation exclusively
and unaffected by § 3466 . . . . The Act was intended to set up a particular scheme
of distribution not to be varied by exceptions found outside the Act, since to do so
would interfere with a well ordered and efficient working Act" Id. at 735. Section
3466 does have the limited function in bankruptcy of providing for a fifth priority
for non-tax debts due to the United States. 4 CoLrIER § 67.24[2], at 263.
In several circuit court cases prior to the Security Bank case, the Government
failed in its attempt to transplant the priority statute inchoate lien doctrine into the
federal tax lien statute. See Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950);
In re Taylorcraft Aviation Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948); United States v.
Sampselli supra. The failure to convince these courts may have been due to poor
litigation strategy. These were all bankruptcy cases and the contention of the United
States was met by the answer that since the priority statute was inapplicable in bank-
ruptcy proceedings the § 3466 holdings in favor of a federal claim, being based on an
inapplicable statute, were not controlling. See United States v. Sampsell, smpra at
734. The Government then established that the inchoate lien doctrine should be a part
of tax lien law in a non-bankruptcy case, United States v. Security Trust & Savings
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), and is now again attempting to inject the inchoate lien
doctrine into bankruptcy, this time through the tax lien cases. Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958). See note 9 supra.
45 See text below note 22 .supra.
46 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 70e.
47 §§ 60a, 67a, 67c, 67d, 70c, 70e.
[Vol.108:77
THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN IN BANKRUPTCY
claims unsupported by liens are entitled only to a fourth priority among
general creditors who as a class traditionally take a position inferior to lien
holders. Consequently the application of an inchoate lien doctrine to favor
federal tax claims not supported by liens would cause serious problems in
the administration of the Bankruptcy Act. One possible mode of applica-
tion of the doctrine would extend a benefit not only to the federal tax
claims but also to the first three priorities by subordinating the inchoate
lien to the first three priorities as well as to the fourth priority federal tax
claim. 48  But it is impossible to find any congressional intention to benefit
those first three priorities in such a fashion, even though its intention to
benefit tax claims might be conceded. An alternative mode of applying the
inchoate lien doctrine gives the federal tax claim a position superior to
the first three priorities,49 a result which seems clearly not intended by
Congress in view of its explicit direction that such federal tax claims be
accorded only a fourth priority. 0 So it seems clear that a tax claim of the
United States which does not have lien status will be paid as a priority under
section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act only after payment of all liens which
are valid against the trustee, including liens which would have been inchoate
as to the United States and subordinate to its priority in proceedings
involving section 3466.1
The problem persists whether the inchoate lien doctrine should be
applied in bankruptcy proceedings to determine the priority of the federal
tax lien as distinguished from the federal non-lien claim. The fact that
section 3466 is inapplicable in bankruptcy proceedings does not necessarily
mean that the inchoate lien doctrine developed in the construction of that
section is inapplicable as part of tax lien law. The decisions under the
tax lien statute did not use the holdings under section 3466 as binding
authority, but rather the Court merely made use of analogous reasoning,
determining that as the two statutes have a similar purpose they should be
similarly construed.5 2 Section 3466 is inapplicable in bankruptcy because
48 Thus, if there were claims for administrative expenses, wages, an inchoate lien
and a federal tax claim, the order of payment might be: administrative expenses,
wages, federal tax claim and inchoate lien-the inchoate lien being subordinated to
the fourth priority federal tax claim.
49 Thus, assuming the same claims as in note 48 supra, the order of payment
might be: federal tax claim, inchoate lien, administrative expenses and wages-the
federal tax claim being first because it is superior in right to the inchoate lien.
50 Additional problems are created if one considers the fact that the federal tax
claims share their fourth priority position with claims of the states for taxes. If an
inchoate lien doctrine is applied to subordinate such liens to federal tax claims, would
such liens also be subordinated to those other claims? What evidence is there that
Congress intended that federal tax claims be accorded favored treatment over their
fellow fourth priority claimants? Conversely, what evidence is there that Congress
intended that fourth priority claimants generally should be given a position superior
to any type of lien?
514 COLLIER § 67.24[2], at 264. But see note 9 supra.
52 See notes 29-30 .upra and accompanying text.
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it specifically conflicts with the Bankruptcy Act.W But there is no such
immediate inherent conflict in applying the inchoate lien doctrine as part of
the tax lien statute. Nor are practical problems found in the simultaneous
application of both the inchoate lien doctrine of the federal tax lien statute
and Bankruptcy Act standards for the validity of liens. It is possible first
to set up the order of priority of the liens as they would have taken against
secured property out of bankruptcy, applying the inchoate lien doctrine as
a tool of lien priority, then to test each lien as it stands in its determined
position against the avoidance powers of the trustee. As to any lien which
is invalidated by the trustee, its place would either be taken by the trustee
for the benefit of the general creditors through the use of a preservation
clause, or it would fall completely with the junior liens advancing.5 4
But although there is no practical conflict between the operation of the
inchoate lien doctrine and the Bankruptcy Act, there may well be theoretical
conflicts within such an approach: the fundamental policies of the inchoate
lien doctrine and those of the Bankruptcy Act may prove irreconcilable.
Especially inasmuch as bankruptcy is not merely a lien enforcement action
but is an equitable liquidation proceeding in which policies other than those
affecting lien enforcement may be operative, all these policies should be
considered before making application of the doctrine in bankruptcy proceed-
ings. As noted, the inchoate lien doctrine is not applicable in bankruptcy
proceedings insofar as non-lien claims of the United States are concerned. 55
No longer is the United States first in distribution but only fourth. 6 In
addition the act provides in section 67c for situations in which even lien
claims of the United States will be paid after certain priority non-lien
claimants.57 From the above instances it may be possible to infer an
underlying congressional attitude that once bankruptcy occurs claims of the
United States are to receive less preferred treatment than they might have
been accorded out of bankruptcy.
Note might also be taken here of the apparently favorable congres-
sional attitude toward statutory liens, which liens constitute a good number
of the inchoate liens. Although section 67c may invalidate certain of these,
this is only after section 67b has expressly validated all statutory liens and
allowed for their perfection in some instances even after bankruptcy has
begun s8  Of course it may be said that this section only validates liens as
against general creditors and does not provide for priority as between liens.
53 See note 44 smpra and accompanying text.
54 See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(2).
5 See notes '43-51 supra and accompanying text. But see note 9 supra.
56 Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4).
57 In general, where the lien is only on personal property and not in possession,
it will be subordinated to administrative expenses and wage claims. Bankruptcy
Act § 67c.
58 "Where . . . such liens are required to be perfected and arise but are not
perfected before bankruptcy, they may nevertheless be valid, if perfected within the
time permitted by and in accordance with the requirements of such laws . ... "
Bankruptcy Act § 67b. The section also exempts such liens from the provisions of
§ 60. Ibid.
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But the contrast should be noted between the congressional attitude which
recognizes and gives status to many such liens for bankruptcy purposes
and that of the Court which subordinates most of them when they conflict
with federal claims outside of bankruptcy.
A contrast may also be noted between the Court's approach to the
priority of federal and local tax liens and congressional bankruptcy treat-
ment of federal and local tax claims. In most instances the inchoate lien
doctrine will place the federal lien ahead of that of the non-federal taxing
authorities 5 9 Yet wherever bankruptcy proceedings affect taxing authori-
ties, the act makes no distinction between federal and non-federal claimants.
Section 64a which grants priorities to certain general creditors after the
payment of liens which are valid as against the trustee, treats all taxing
authorities on a parity: federal and local taxes will share pro rata. 0
Another example of equivalent congressional treatment of the two is found
in section 67c(2) which invalidates as against the trustee most statutory
liens on which no enforcement action has been taken, excepting such liens
for taxes, federal or local.6'
It is recognized that none of these arguments presents an actual conflict
between the inchoate lien doctrine and the Bankruptcy Act, inasmuch as
they are premised upon provisions controlling not priority as between liens,
but only priority of non-lien claims or validity of a lien as against non-lien
claims. Yet they are indications of congressional bankruptcy policy with
which the operatioi of the inchoate lien doctrine may be said to conflict.
Bankruptcy being basically a statutory proceeding, we might reasonably
hesitate before interpolating additional judicial standards into its specific
terms. And since Congress in this area is not only the protector of the
federal revenues but also the arbiter of competing claims, in determining
whether the inchoate lien doctrine ought to be applied in bankruptcy
proceedings, it seems especially appropriate to take into consideration all
of the above mentioned aspects in which the doctrine would appear to con-
flict with the philosophy of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy has been char-
acterized as an equitable proceeding.P Such of the bankruptcy equities
involved as can be inferred from congressional action have been mentioned.
There would appear, in addition, to be certain injustices in the application
of a doctrine which provides for payment of claims of the United States in
59 See notes 16-18, 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
60 3 COLLIER § 64.02, at 2056.
01 Rochelle v. City of Dallas, 264 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1959); fi re Baron, 165
F. Supp. 186 (D. Conn. 1958); Wolfe, The Correlation of Liens and Priorities, 27
TErnm. L.Q. 268, 274 (1953). Contra, Matter of Gordon, 27 REF. J. 85 (1953) (E.D.
Mich. 1952). This last decision precipitated a proposed amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Act to "clarify" the intent of Congress that local taxes were excluded from
67c(2). H.R. 5796, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). This bill passed the House on
July 19, 1954, but died in the Senate. 100 CONG. REc. 10916 (1954).
62 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939).
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full, although they are not discharged by the bankruptcy, prior to the making
of any payment to those lien creditors whose claims are dischargeable.'
We are directed by section 64a(4) of the act to do this in respect to general
non-lien claimants. There appear to be no compelling reasons to ex-
tend such a policy any further than the clear statutory directive." The
inchoate lien doctrine is a judicial deviation from the normal lien priority
standard of first-in-time in order to protect federal revenues" in an area
where no statutory standards are forthcoming. However, Congress has
provided a statutory standard in bankruptcy, and has specified those
particular instances in which a deviation from the norm should occur. 6
It is arguable that the interest of the United States is sufficiently protected
by invalidation of liens which Congress rather than the Court has decided
are not sufficiently perfected, and by the granting to the United States of
a fourth priority position among the general creditors as to any part of its
claim which is unsatisfied from its lien status. Under such a view any
court protection of federal revenues in bankruptcy proceedings in addition
to the protection specified by Congress would be quite unnecessary.
It is further arguable that mechanical application in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings of both the inchoate lien doctrine and the bankruptcy standards of
validity of liens would fail to appreciate the fact that Congress was not
entirely unmindful of the problems of inchoate interests in bankruptcy and
did make an attempt to treat such liens as by state law are deemed to be
perfected at some time prior to the time at which all of their attributes
become fixed.67  The purpose of section 67c is to lessen the share of
statutory liens in bankruptcy by providing that such liens which have
attached to personalty will either be subordinated to the first two priorities
of section 64a, if the lien is not in possession,8 or will be completely in-
6 3 But note that state tax claims are similarly not dischargeable. Bankruptcy
Act § 17a(1).
64 Efforts have been made to further limit the share of the United States in
bankruptcy by limitation of its priority status to claims for taxes for the three years
preceding the bankruptcy, with the remainder of its claims sharing with general
non-priority claimants and being dischargeable. A bill to this effect passed the House
in the 85th Congress. H.R. 12802, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See 104 CONG. REC.
15614 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1958). The bill was reintroduced, amended, and passed by
the House in the 86th Congress. H.R. 2236, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). See 105
CONG. REc. 15551 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1959).
65 United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 51 (1950).
66 See Bankruptcy Act § 64a.
67 Cf. Wolfe, supra note 61, at 274. And see Kennedy, Statutory Liens in Bank-
ruptcy, 39 Mi, . L. REv. 697, 719 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Kennedy, 39 MINN.
L. REv. 697].
6 8 "Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a proceed-
ing under this Act, and except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent: (1) though
valid against the trustee under subdivision b of this section, statutory liens, including
liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to any State or any subdivision
thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of such property, and
liens, whether statutory or not, of distress for rent shall be postponed in payment to
the debts specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision a of section 64 of this
Act . . . " Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1).
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validated and will take only as an unsecured creditor's interest if no attempt
has been made to attach the lien to specific property as by levy or distraint.69
Yet statutory liens would include many of those liens heretofore found
inchoate by the Court such as state tax liens, mechanics' liens, and land-
lords' liens. In addition, liens of any variety which at state law are so
unperfected as to be capable of being avoided by a subsequent lien on the
property will be avoided in bankruptcy by the trustee through section 70c7
0
Application of the inchoate lien doctrine would without congressional
authorization go further than providing for a primacy of federal tax claims
as against such unperfected state interests, and would provide for priority
of the federal lien against a class of prior-in-time liens which would at state
law defeat a subsequent lien creditor.
Of course, in appraising the role that the inchoate lien doctrine should
play in bankruptcy proceedings one might well regard the two distribution
doctrines as directed toward the solution of two distinct problems: the
inchoate lien doctrine provides for the validity of a lien as against the
federal tax lien, while section 67c provides for the validity of a lien as
against general creditors and makes no provision for priorities as among
liens.71 In fact, the legislative history of section 67c leads to the con-
clusion that it was intended to insure that accumulated statutory claims do
not deplete the estate to the exclusion of administration expenses and
wages, to protect unsecured creditors from so-called "floating liens," but
not to help a secured lien as against a "floating lien." 7 2 This purpose is
accomplished by use of a preservation clause,73 so that invalidation of a
lien prior to the federal tax lien will not move the federal lien up in priority,
the beneficiaries of the invalidation being the general creditors. The United
States does have a priority before most general creditors, but it is not alone
the intended beneficiary of the invalidation. 4 Thus, since the operation of
section 67c does not benefit the United States directly, it may be argued
that that section is not a substitute for the inchoate lien rule, which should
therefore be applied.
On the other hand it is arguable that the bankruptcy treatment of
statutory liens should be deemed a substitute for the inchoate lien doctrine.
It can be said that there are here not two problems to be faced-the validity
of certain liens as against other liens and as against general creditors-but
69 "[T]he provisions of subdivision b of this section to the contrary notith-
standing, statutory liens created or recognized by the laws of any State for debts
owing to any person, including any State or any subdivision thereof, on personal
property not accompanied by possession of, or by levy upon or by sequestration or
distraint of such property, shall not be valid against the trustee .... " Bank-
ruptcy Act § 67c(2).
7 0 This section gives the trustee the status of a creditor with a lien by legal or
equitable proceedings as to all property of the bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act § 70c.
'714 COLLIER § 67.27 [3], at 296.
72 Id. § 67.20[3], at 189; Kennedy, 39 MiNx. L. REv. 697, 718.
73 "The court may on due notice order . . . any lien invalid under clause (2)
of this subdivision c to be preserved for the benefit of the estate . . . and such invalid
lien . . . shall pass to the trustee." Bankruptcy Act § 67c(2).
•74 Kennedy, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 931.
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rather the single problem of the treatment of "floating liens" in bankruptcy
proceedings. If this is so, a testing of validity under the bankruptcy stand-
ards should result only in the application of the consequences specified in
the act; the congressional treatment must here be exclusive.
Both the inchoate lien doctrine and section 67c test the validity of a
lien by comparing the incidents of the lien as against a standard set for
perfection. In a lien enforcement proceeding involving a contest between
a federal and a competing lien, when a court in testing a lien under the
inchoate lien doctrine finds that it is not sufficiently perfected it will
subordinate the inchoate lien to the federal tax lien. This appears to be
the extent of its role since in non-bankruptcy lien enforcement there is no
federal power to completely invalidate an inchoate lien as to non-lien
creditors. The state standards for validity of a lien are the only ones
applicable to that problem, and under these standards the lien is valid.
Congressional power in bankruptcy is, however, broader than that of
a court in non-bankruptcy proceedings. Under the constitutional power of
Congress to provide for bankruptcy proceedings, 5 it would appear that
standards could be set up in bankruptcy legislation which would provide
for the validity of liens as among themselves, not merely as against general
creditors. This latter adjustment, as between lienors as a class and un-
secured creditors as a class, is presently the focus of all provisions for lien
invalidation except those of section 70c: through the medium of a preserva-
tion clause by which all liens retain their relative position against the
secured assets, with the share of an invalidated lien going to the general
creditors, relative lien priority remains unaffected. However, under section
70c, liens junior to the invalidated lien do advance in priority. And the
use of preservation clauses as attached to all of the other invalidation sec-
tions are a relatively recent part of bankruptcy administration. 0 Without
the device of the preservation clause, invalidation of a lien under the
Bankruptcy Act does in effect provide for the validity of liens among
themselves, with the benefit to general creditors of the invalidation being
merely that there are fewer secured claimants to be paid first.
Granting then congressional authority to provide for the validity of
liens as among themselves we find, however, that in its treatment of the
broader picture, the liquidation as a whole, Congress itself apparently felt
that its bankruptcy power was better used to the primary benefit of the
general creditors, with lien creditors sharing with all others to the extent
of the unsatisfied portion of their liens. It appears that both Congress in
the Bankruptcy Act and the Court through its inchoate lien doctrine are
dealing with a similar type of lien, the "floating" or less than fully definite
lien. The fact that the standards specified by Congress and the conse-
quences which follow from a failure to meet those standards are different
from those specified by the Court acting to the extent of its own limited
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
76 It was not until 1952 that preservation clauses were added to the invalidation
sections 67d and 70e. See H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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power outside of bankruptcy, does not necessitate the conclusion that there
are here two distinct problems. It seems reasonable to say that since the
act addresses itself to the position of the same lienor as does the inchoate
lien doctrine and since the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act must be applied
in bankruptcy proceedings, the statutory provisions should be held to pre-
empt the area and should alone be applied.
Since section 67c establishing specified congressional standards for
statutory liens applies only to such liens on personalty,7 7 it has been sug-
gested that in the absence of like standards for treatment of statutory liens on
realty the Security Bank line of cases can be invoked to determine relative
priority of this latter class of liens.78 The safeguard usually present for in-
suring the perfection of liens applicable to real estate is the recording system.
Liens not recorded are typically vulnerable at state law to subsequent
recording by a judgment creditor. Thus by operation of the state law
standard of perfection alone the trustee would prevail over an unrecorded
and so "unperfected" lien through section 70c; 79 so also would the federal
tax lien, at least when recorded. Admittedly the state law standard is not
as rigorous as that of the Court's inchoate lien doctrine, which adds to the
power of the federal lien by allowing it to overcome interests otherwise
perfected at state law. But to argue from this that the inchoate lien doctrine
should therefore apply fails to recognize the fact that Congress apparently
appreciated the problem but felt that state law standards were sufficient.
Whether the congressional judgment was correct is not here an issue.
Congress, which did provide special bankruptcy standards for liens on
personalty, provided no such standards for liens on realty. It seems
reasonable to say that since the problem was appreciated, the treatment as
afforded by Congress is the one which courts must use in judging the
sufficiency of liens as against any other interests in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.
Similar analysis may be made as to non-statutory liens such as con-
tractual liens, garnishments, and attachments. These have been held to
be inchoate as to the federal tax lien.80 As to the perfection of these liens,
the Bankruptcy Act has no standards additional to those at state law. The
trustee tests this perfection through section 70c. The act also tests these
liens as to time of their perfection: they may be avoided or invalidated
77 See note 68 supra. The section may be read as applying to liens of distress
for rent, whether on real or personal property. Such a reading may, however, have
no significance since it appears that a landlord's lien will attach to the tenant's chattels.
1 AmERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.72 (Casner ed. 1952).
78 4 COLLIER § 67.24[2], at 265.
79 See note 70 supra.
80 See notes 26, 31, 41 supra and accompanying text.
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through section 60b I" and 67a 82 of the act if they were perfected within
four months previous to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. The pur-
pose of these sections is to avoid disparate treatment between those cred-
itors with claims in bankruptcy and those who have gotten some satis-
faction from, or a judgment against, the bankrupt shortly before bankruptcy
occurs. This does away with the race among creditors insofar as bank-
ruptcy is concerned.8 No benefit will redound to unaffected judgment
creditors through an exercise by the trustee of his powers under these
sections since both are equipped with a preservation clause.84 But although
it thus cannot be stated that Congress has provided its own treatment of the
inchoacy problem for such non-statutory liens, it is arguable that congres-
sional recognition of the inchoate lien difficulty, as witnessed by section 67c,
and its failure to specifically treat the difficulty here manifest a judgment
by Congress that state standards of perfection are sufficient protection for
all concerned in bankruptcy proceedings. Insofar as certain of these liens
which, as perfected, would have been valid in non-bankruptcy proceedings
will be invalidated in bankruptcy, some benefit will redound to all creditors
which they would not otherwise have had. As to the federal tax lien this
benefit may be sufficient quid pro quo for not having the advantage of
the inchoate lien doctrine.
As to those liens covered by section 67c the time at which the liens are
tested for perfection is the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. 5
Under the inchoate lien doctrine, the time at which a competing lien must
be perfected is as of the date that the federal tax lien arises.88 In applying
section 67c rather than the inchoate lien doctrine the situation may arise
that the lien competing with the federal tax lien may have been inchoate at
the time the federal lien arose and yet have become sufficiently perfected by
the bankruptcy standards in the interval between the time of the arising of
the federal lien and the occurrence of bankruptcy. 7 In such a case no
benefit at all will accrue to the federal tax lien if the inchoate lien doctrine
8 1 "Any such preference [as defined in § 60a] may be avoided by the trustee if
the creditor receiving it . . . has, at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable
cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." Bankruptcy Act § 60b. A § 60a prefer-
ence is, in general, a transfer of property of the debtor on account of an antecedent
debt, while the debtor is insolvent, and made within four months of bankruptcy.
82 "Every lien against the property of a person obtained by attachment, judgment,
levy, or other legal or equitable process or proceedings within four months before
the filing of a petition . . . by or against such person shall be deemed null and
void (a) if at the time when such lien was obtained such person was insolvent ... "
Bankruptcy Act § 67a(1).
83 Wolfe, supra note 61, at 269; Kennedy, 39 MINN. L. R.v. 697.
84 Bankruptcy Act §§ 60b, 67a(3).
5 Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118 (1948).
86 Cf. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
87 For example, a landlord's distraint which is inchoate as to the federal lien,
see note 32 supra, may have been "enforced by sale before the filing of a petition"
in bankruptcy, and therefore be unaffected by § 67c.
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is not invoked: the intervention of bankruptcy would in effect allow a rela-
tion back of the perfection of the non-federal lien so as to defeat the federal
lien. This the Supreme Court has not allowed in non-bankruptcy lien
enforcement situations.88 However, the occasion of bankruptcy makes the
maintenance of such lien enforcement proceedings impossible. There is no
anomaly in the situation of the United States having rights available to it
during pre-bankruptcy diminished by the supervention of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, in its not being able to avoid prior-in-time previously "unper-
fected" interests. The position of the United States might be likened to
that of a creditor who can avoid a fraudulent transfer prior to bankruptcy;
the creditor would no longer be able to avoid the transfer once bankruptcy
intervenes. A creditor having a right before bankruptcy which is not exer-
cised at the time bankruptcy proceedings are started will lose that right
insofar as it benefits him alone.89 As to such unexercised rights the power
to exercise them will go to the trustee under section 70e of the act, to be
exercised for the benefit of the estate, the general creditors.90 If this were
not so, we would have the spectacle of a creditor obtaining some advantage
over other creditors after bankruptcy was started, while the whole attempt
of the act is not only to freeze status as of the date of bankruptcy, but even
to invalidate advantages flowing to creditors for some period of time prior
to this date.91
8 8 Cf. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
89 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 70e.
90 "A transfer made or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor . . .which,
under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudulent as against or voidable
for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor, having a claim provable under this
Act, shall be null and void as against the trustee of such debtor." Bankruptcy Act
§70e(1).
1' Cf. §§ 60b, 67a. Query whether in the situation under discussion the trustee
under 70e would be able to take advantage of the non-bankruptcy priority of the
federal tax lien as against a competing lien, even should some benefit accrue thereby to
the general creditors. This might occur if the federal lien were invalid as to the
trustee, as where unrecorded, and yet, out of bankruptcy, superior to the competing
lien. The typical operation of § 70e however is to invoke, through the person of the
trustee rather than the creditor, standard lien law. Per contra the position presented
in this Note is that the inchoate lien doctrine as a part of the law determining lien
priorities should be inapplicable once bankruptcy intervenes.
As to whether or not the federal lien is invalid as against the trustee if unre-
corded, note that INT. Rrv. CODE oF 1954, § 6323 (a) makes the federal lien invalid
if not recorded as against judgment creditors. The cases and authors are in conflict
as to whether the trustee is to be considered a "judgment creditor" within this section.
Note the statement by the Supreme Court in United States v. Gilbert Associates,
Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), that "judgment creditor" was to be used "in the usual,
conventional sense of a judgment of a court of record . . . ." Id. at 364. How-
ever, this case involved a city with a tax lien claiming "judgment creditor" status,
and the status of the trustee in bankruptcy as to this section has not been settled by
the Supreme Court. Compare United States v. Sands, 174 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1949)
(dictum), and In re Sport Coal Co., 125 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955), with Brust v. Sturr, 237 F.2d 135 (2d
Cir. 1956); United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955), and In re
Fidelity Tube Corp., 167 F. Supp. 402 (D.NJ. 1958). And see 4 COLLIER § 67.24[1],
at 240, n.6a; Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 24 REF. J. 24, 27
(1950); Plumb, Federal Tax Collection and Lien Problems, 13 TAx L. REv. 459,
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Although it may be decided that the inchoate lien doctrine should be
inapplicable in bankruptcy for any of the reasons above discussed, there
remains the theoretical problem of the rule that priority among liens in
bankruptcy is the same as in non-bankruptcy situations.9 2  The inchoate
lien doctrine is a very obvious part of the law which determines non-
bankruptcy priority among liens. On close examination, however, we find
that the rule dictating identical lien priority order in and out of bank-
ruptcy is not of such immutable quality that it may not be changed without
explicit statutory directions where necessary to further other bankruptcy
policies.
One instance of deviation in bankruptcy proceedings from the ordinary
non-bankruptcy lien priority order has arisen under section 67c(1) which
subordinates statutory liens on personalty not in possession to adminis-
trative expenses and wages. A problem arises where of two competing
liens, the senior is subordinated and the junior lien is not. Since sub--
ordination under 67c (1) is only to the priority claimants and not specifically
to other liens, to follow the identical lien priority rule it would be necessary
to subordinate both liens to the priorities. The Third Circuit has so held.
93
This course however is not uniformly accepted, and two other courts of
appeal have reached results which varied the rule in whole or in part in
order to accomplish a result which they deemed more consonant with the
policies of the act as a whole. One court thought that the act required the
junior but unsubordinated lien to be first-in-right. 94 The other decided
that the junior lien retained its relative position against the assets and that
the part of the senior lien unsatisfied due to 67c(1) was subordinated to
the junior lien.9 5 And the use by the trustee of his "strong-arm" power
under section 70c may similarly affect standard lien priority since an in-
validation under this clause may be of a senior lien.96 Thus, there being no
preservation clause attached to 70c, junior liens are advanced to the extent
of the invalidation. Similarly a deviation from the non-bankruptcy order
of priority in the inchoate lien area might be deemed a valid exercise of the
power of a bankruptcy court to effectuate the policies of the act as a whole.
Moreover, it is arguable that congressional expectation, if not intent,
was that lien priority in bankruptcy was to be on a first-in-time basis.
488 (1958) ; Seligson, Recent Developments in the Field of Federal Tax Claims, 29
REF. J. 7, 11 (1955); 68 HARv. L. REv. 1475 (1955). Compare the great power of
the trustee under § 70c in other situations. Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955) ; Sampsell v. Straub, 194 F.2d 228 (9th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 927 (1952).
92 4 Colmp §§ 67.27[3], 70.70.
93 ln re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 1030 (1957). This decision was subsequently followed in In re Einhorn
Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
94 City of New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943).
95 California State Dept. of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th
Cir. 1954).
96 Cf. Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied. 348 U.S.
913 (1955).
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Coexistent with the "rule" that bankruptcy does not affect priority as be-
tween liens there is the axiom that the order of priority among liens is that
of first-in-time, first-in-right. 97 It appears plausible that Congress, if it
had any thought on the matter, had this rule in mind for application under
the Bankruptcy Act in the absence of any express provisions to the
contrary.98 It is clear that when Congress has wanted to prescribe an order
of distribution peculiar to bankruptcy, it has done so in definite terms; 99
yet in this matter of lien priority Congress has remained silent. Even the
Court concedes that the order of priority under the tax lien statute is that
of first-in-time, 10 although modified to the extent that the "first" must
also be perfected according to the Court's standards. Since the application
of these standards, as has been pointed out, may be inappropriate in bank-
ruptcy proceedings as conflicting with the policies of the act itself, the
standard should revert to the familiar one of first-in-time.
CONCLUSION
In determining for purposes of bankruptcy distribution the priority of
the federal tax lien as against that species of competing right which may
be characterized an inchoate lien, the interests of the United States as
balanced against the interests of competing lienors seem to be adequately
and equitably served by placing the United States in the same position as
any ordinary lien creditor. This will typically involve a rule of first-in-time.
The perfection required of a competing interest will be that required under
state law and the federal lien will be prior to an antecedent interest only
where such an interest is so unperfected that subsequent state-created
interests would also have priority as against it. Even if a deviation from
this rule is appropriate outside of bankruptcy inasmuch as the necessity of
securing adequate tax revenues is such a consideration as to require over-
riding of otherwise valid interests, the intervention of bankruptcy largely
negates this consideration. The additional burden of lost tax revenues
falling on the whole of the population would not seem so great as to justify
instead the imposition of a far more onerous burden on individual creditors
participating in the bankruptcy proceeding whose claims are therein dis-
charged. Moreover, the extent to which non-application in bankruptcy of
the inchoate lien doctrine will impair the interests of the United States
appears not inordinate in light of the fact that many of the inchoate liens
are statutory liens which will be invalidated by section 67c(2), 101- and some
of the non-statutory inchoate liens may arise shortly before bankruptcy
and be avoided or invalidated by sections 60b and 67a.'0 2 Since the United
97 53 C.J.S. Liens § 10b (1948).
98 , re Freeze-In Mfg. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 259, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
99 Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 64a.
300 United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
101 See note 69 supra.
102 See notes 81, 82 supra.
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States still retains its fourth priority among general creditors any part of
the federal lien unsatisfied from its lien status will take in priority status,
and no general creditors lower than the fourth priority will benefit until all
federal tax claims are satisfied. While certain statutory inchoate liens will
not be completely invalidated but only subordinated to the first two priorities
of section 64a, administration expenses and wage claims,103 so that no benefit
will accrue to federal claims, Congress' own determination of the extent to
which such liens should be subordinated clearly precludes the inference of
any congressional intent to give advantage to federal claims through this
subordination mechanism.
Two caveats however apply to the proposed solution of first-in-time.
The first is that the explicit statutory exceptions in favor of certain possibly
subsequent interests as against an unfiled federal tax lien would of course
not be affected.'0 4 Secondly, the solution of first-in-time applies only as
between federal and other liens. This would not affect the power of a state
to make its tax liens prior in right to prior-in-time state-created interests;
such is the standard procedure at present. Problems of circuity may
arise since the federal lien may be prior in time and right to a state lien but
subsequent in time and right to a mortgage, which mortgage will be sub-
sequent in right by state statute to the state lien. However, the solution
here proposed does not create this problem; the problem obviously exists
at present where the state lien is choate but subsequent in time to the federal
tax lien, and by state statute a first lien on all property of the debtor.'0 5
Solution of such circuity problems is beyond the scope of this Note.0 8
The federal tax lien priority problem itself is to reconcile, if possible,
conflicting statutes, since Congress does not appear to have specifically
considered the interrelationship of the Internal Revenue Code and the
Bankruptcy Act. However where Congress has in the bankruptcy context
given consideration to problems similar to that underlying the inchoate lien
doctrine, intentions ascertainable from its treatment of those problems seem
to point out a fundamental conflict between the judicial doctrine and the
philosophy of the Bankruptcy Act. In this situation, of course, the policies
revealed in the act must control.
D.L.M.
103 Bankruptcy Act § 67c.
104 INT. REV. CODE F 1954, § 6323 (a). See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
105 This last provision clearly can have no effect on the priority of the federal
lien. Michigan v. United States, 317 U.S. 338 (1943); United States v. City of
Greenville, 118 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1941).
'
06 The problem of circuity may also arise under § 67c(1). See the treatment
in 4 COLLIER § 67.27[3].
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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON A MUNIC-
IPALITY'S POWER TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS OR EX-
TEND CREDIT TO INDIVIDUALS AND ASSOCIATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The social and economic problems of our changing society have pro-
duced innumerable pressures on local governments to expand their functions
and to finance projects which are beyond the traditional scope of municipal
government. Local governments have become involved in slum clearance
and urban renewal,' construction and operation of parking facilities, 2 and
construction and leasing of commercial recreational facilities 3 or plants for
use by private industry.4 In general a municipality may expend public
funds only for purposes which are "public" in nature.5 As a result, when
the validity of such municipal action has been drawn into question, a
doctrine of "public purpose" has been employed to determine whether the
municipality has exceeded its authority. However, the "public purpose"
doctrine is an illusive guide. At one extreme of the gamut of municipal
activities are those which are so closely related to public health, welfare,
safety and morals that there is no question that public funds may be ex-
pended on them. Thus, it is clear that a city may use tax funds to provide
the traditional municipal services such as police and fire protection, sanita-
tion and highway maintenance. At the other extreme are activities which
are clearly beyond the accepted scope of municipal government. Outright
grants to individuals because they have the political power to win the
necessary legislative support, or appropriations for activities such as operat-
ing taverns would fall within this class. Between these two extremes is
a hazy area in which "public purpose" justification is not so clear. It is in
this last area that the significant legal problems arise. Is it proper for a
1 See Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954) ; Redfern v.
Board of Comm'rs, 137 N.J.L. 356, 59 A.2d 641 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948); Belovsky
v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947).
2 See Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954);
DeLorenzo v. City of Hackensack, 9 N.J. 379, 88 A.2d 511 (1952); Comereski v.
City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955) ; McSorley v. Fitzgerald, 359
Pa. 264, 59 A.2d 142 (1948).
3 See State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d
34 (Fla. 1956); Fraser v. Township of Teaneck 137 N.J.L. 119, 58 A.2d 610 (Sup.
Ct. 1948).
4 See Halbert v. Helena-West Helena Industrial Dev. Corp., 266 Ark. 620, 291
S.W.2d 802 (1956); Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80
(1950); Village of Deming v. Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956).
5 R YNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 343 (1957): "A municipality, in exercising the powers
granted to it by the state legislature, may expend public funds, whether generated by
taxation or by borrowing, only for public purposes. The state legislature is power-
less to authorize these expenditures except for public purposes, although a legislative
determination thereon is greatly respected by the courts." Note that state constitu-
tional provisions limit municipal power to expend public funds to corporations and
individuals. See note 18 infra and accompanying text.
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city to encourage the use of mass transportation facilities by making pay-
ments to private transportation companies to offset losses from reduced
fares and improved services? 6 Is there a sufficient public purpose in having
a major league professional baseball team located in a city to justify
expenditure of tax funds in building a stadium for its use? 7 Questions of
this nature are not readily answered simply by looking to the verbal
formulation of the "public purpose" doctrine.
Attempts to define "public purpose" in general terms have not been
successful. A typical example is: "'a public purpose' is one that affects a
political subdivision of the State as a body politic. In other words, it must
affect all the people in some material way, not a limited number in a special
way." 8 The defect in this sort of definition is that such terms as "body
politic," "material way," "limited number," and "special way" do little to
clarify the problem. A more pragmatic approach recognizes that there is
no universal test. "Each case must be decided with reference to the object
sought to be accomplished and to the degree and manner in which the
object affects the public welfare." 9 This tack assumes that there is some
substance to the concept of public purpose which can be identified in any
given situation though it admits that generalizations are difficult. A third
alternative rejects this assumption, saying that public purpose is "merely a
term of classification to distinguish the objects for which, according to
settled usage, the government is to provide, from those which, by the like
usage, are left to private inclination, interest or liberality"; 10 this last view
conceives that the label of public purpose is attached only after the more
basic determination of whether it is proper to allow government to engage
in the activity has already been made. In any case, few objective, relatively
measurable standards-economic feasibility, number of persons benefited,
necessity for government action-are available for determining the proper
scope of municipal power to use public funds. In face of this confusion and
uncertainty many state constitutional amendments have attempted to provide
at once a more specific and more stringent limitation on the power of
municipalities by eliminating the public purpose test from the determination.
This Note attempts to indicate the relationship between the illusive "public
purpose" doctrine and the more precise state constitutional provisions.
6 Philadelphia, Pa. has instituted such an experimental program to relieve traffic
congestion in the center part of the city and to increase the use of commutation serv-
ices. Letter From David Berger, City Solicitor, to the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review, Dec. 1, 1958, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania.
See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
7 Financial support for such an institution has been given serious consideration
by municipalities which have major league baseball teams. See Philadelphia Evening
Bulletin, March 25, 1959, p. 1, col. 4.
8 McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12, 29 (Tenn. 1958) (dissent). The
dissent in this case expressed a traditional view. The majority opinion took a contrary
position.
9 Hoglund v. City of Summit, 28 N.J. 540, 549, 147 A.2d 521, 526 (1959).
10 People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township Board, 20 Mich. 452, 485 (1870).
Note that this statement was by Justice Cooley, author of CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS (8th ed. 1927). See note 13 infra.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for municipal
corporations to encourage the establishment of railroad facilities by floating
bonds, subscribing to stock, and making direct appropriations to the railroad
companies.I
"Aid from states, counties, and municipalities, often competing with
one another, was even more lavish [than federal aid]. The states
often granted tax-exemption, protection from competition, and liberal
charters. Some states lent the roads their credit, others subscribed
outright to the stock of railway companies. Many states . . made
extensive land grants . . . . Counties and municipalities subscribed
liberally to railway stock and often donated money outright. Counties
and towns of Kentucky incurred a debt of over thirteen million dollars
for railroad construction; eighty-six counties in Illinois subsidized
railroads to the extent of over sixteen million dollars; the municipalities
of Kansas contributed well over twelve million dollars to the railroads
of that state." 12
The validity of such municipal action was challenged on the ground that it
was improper to exercise the power to tax for the benefit of a private
corporation. Most courts upheld the municipal actions, finding that even
though private railroad companies were the direct beneficiaries there was a
sufficient public purpose in encouraging the building of railroad facilities
so that a municipality did not by such transit-promoting activities abuse its
broad discretion to exercise the power to tax for a public purpose.'3 When,
however, a number of improprieties occurred, some of the courts began to
take the opposite position. In People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township
Board,14 the court considered particular abuses accompanying such aid to
the railroads and found that the aid was not supported by the public purpose
concept.
"We know . . . the history of these municipal and county bonds;
how the Legislature, yielding to popular excitement about railroads
authorized their issue, how grand jurors and county commissioners
11 Murphy v. Dever, 320 Ill. 186, 188-89, 150 N.E. 663 (1926): "The demand for
improved transportation facilities had developed a mania for extending public aid to
private corporations. In order to aid in the construction of railroads, municipalities
were subscribing for stock, issuing negotiable bonds as a means of paying the sub-
scriptions and taxing the inhabitants or the property within their limits to pay the
indebtedness . .. ."
12 2 MORISON & COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 113 (4th
ed. 1950).
13 I CooLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 464-69 (8th ed. 1927). Note that
some courts did hold that a direct gift to the railroad company was improper because
the taxpayers received no proprietary interest. Such reasoning implies that an appro-
priation in exchange for a return of stock in the company would have been considered
proper. See Whiting v. Sheboygan & F.L.R.R., 25 Wis. 167 (1870).
3420 Mich. 452 (1870). See note 10 supra.
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and city officers were moulded to the purposes of speculators; how
recklessly railroad officers abused the overwrought confidence of the
public, and what burdens of debt and taxation have resulted to the
people." 15
The court reasoned that taxation for the benefit of a railroad was no more
a public purpose than taxation to benefit any private business which might
be a local necessity. In addition, the allowance of government subsidies
was considered to be fraught with dangers of corruption.
"[W]hen the State once enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall
not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those
most likely to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed
to enhance the profits of the stronger." 16
It was against the background of this growing leeriness both in judicial
decisions and in the public at large that the states moved to provide addi-
tional safeguards; 17 excessive tax burdens on local communities, attitudes
that it was improper for government to have an interest in economic enter-
prises and fears of abuse by corrupt public officials precipitated the amend-
ment of state constitutions with the clear intent of placing more narrow
limitations on municipal power to aid economic enterprises than had been
imposed by judicial application of the "public purpose" doctrine.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The broad outlines of the various constitutional provisions which were
enacted in light of the experiences of the era of railroad expansion are
15 Id. at 493.
16 Id. at 487.
17"[The] very extensive and highly speculative subsidizing of ventures by the
states . . . caused considerable embarrassment to them and finally resulted in the
incorporation in certain state constitutions . . . of strict bans against the giving,
lending or pledging of the credit of the state. Under such a prohibition, any plan
which in effect loans or gives the credit of the state is forbidden regardless of the
particular form of the transaction." I VERNON'S ANNOTATED CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS 697-98 (1955). See also, 18 AmERICAN L. REGISTER 487, 503 (1870) :
"The subject of taxing localities to aid in building railroads therein, attracted great
attention from the recent Illinois Constitutional Convention . . . . Henceforth in
Illinois by an organic provision . . . municipalities will be confined to their proper
and legitimate objects, and aid and donations by public bodies, at public expense, to
private corporations will cease. . . . Nothing but the bitter fruits of the opposite
policy brought about the adoption into the new constitution of the state, the prohibi-
tion . . . mentioned." A typical judicial statement of the purposes underlying the
type of amendment which was common during this era is that "during the years
immediately preceding its adoption, the state and many of its counties, cities, and towns
had by legislative enactments become stockholders or bondholders in, and had in other
ways loaned their credit to, and had become interested in the organization and opera-
tion of railroads, banks, and other commercial institutions. Many of these institutions
were poorly managed, and either failed or became heavily involved, and, as a result,
the state, counties, and cities interested in them became responsible for their debts
and other obligations. These obligations fell ultimately on the taxpayers. Hence
the amendment, the essence of which was to restrict the activities and functions of
the state, county, and municipality to that of government, and forbid their engaging
directly or indirectly in commercial enterprises for profit." Bailey v. City of Tampa,
92 Fla. 1030, 1034-35, 111 So. 119, 120 (1926).
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similar. There are, nevertheless, problems in their interpretation and ad-
ministration which are unique to the language of the particular local provi-
sion involved. The Pennsylvania provision is one of the simplest in form
and can be used as a basis of comparison for provisions in other state
constitutions.
"The General Assembly shall not authorize any county, city, borough,
township or incorporated district to become a stockholder in any com-
pany, association or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money
for, or to loan its credit to, any corporation, association, institution or
individual." Is
By contrast, the Kentucky constitution sets up a number of explicit
exceptions to language of general prohibition otherwise very similar to
that of Pennsylvania: it expressly excepts appropriations or loans of credit
for the purpose of "constructing or maintaining bridges, turnpike roads,
or gravel roads" and allows a municipal corporation to transfer property
or money to the Commonwealth for the purpose of locating or building a
capitol. 1' Because of these express exceptions the Kentucky court inter-
preting its constitution has stated that all appropriations or loans of credit
not within the express exceptions are prohibited.20 A different line of ap-
proach is represented by provisions in other states which permit an appro-
priation or extension of credit to private indivduals or corporations upon
the approval of the taxpayers in a municipal election. 2' However, while
a municipal appropriation may be found to be unconstitutional in the
absence of such an election,2 it has been held that the approval of the
voters will not validate a municipal project when the court finds that the
project cannot be justified as being for a public purpose.2
Several state constitutions place a restriction on the extension of
credit by a municipality but appear to allow the municipality a greater
freedom in the appropriation of funds. The Massachusetts constitution
provides that, "the credit of the Commonwealth shall not in any manner be
given or loaned to or in aid of any individual or of any private association,
or of any corporation .... ,, 24 However, it does not place a similar
18 PA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 7.
19 Ky. CoNsT. § 179.
20 Board of Education v. City of Corbin, 301 Ky. 686, 192 S.W.2d 951 (1946).
But see Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950) ; Hager v.
Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904).
21 E.g., TEx. CoNsT. art. 3, § 52.
22 Azbill v. Lexington Mfg. Co., 188 Tenn. 477, 221 S.W.2d 522 (1949).
23 McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tenn. 1958): "The public
taxes or . . . the public credit can not be donated or applied to anything but a
public use or corporate purpose . . . . [The contrary could not be done] even if
the vote of the people was 100%, because, if they could vote a gift to one individual or
corporation, they could likewise vote a gift to each citizen or corporation in the city
or the county, which, of course, was never contemplated by the constitutional pro-
vision and could wreck the economy of any city or county or State."
2 4 MAss. CoNsT. art. LXII, § 1.
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restriction on appropriation or loan of money or property, 5 and the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in an advisory opinion has indicated
that a proposed payment of money to a railroad in return for a continuation
of passenger service and an option to purchase at salvage value portions of
certain of the railroad's lines was constitutional because it involved only
cash payments and not a loan of credit.26 The New York constitution, while
prohibiting a municipal appropriation "in aid" of a private corporation or
individual, allows such aid to a public corporation for a public purpose; a
loan of credit, on the other hand, may not be made even to a public cor-
poration.2 7  An attempt to explain this dichotomy was made in Union
Free School Dist. v. Town of Rye: 28
"[I]f a local unit, unable to raise by taxation or by use of its credit
all the moneys it desired to expend for its local governmental purposes,
were permitted to rush to another local unit with better credit, or to
the State and to induce the loan of sound credit to bolster up its own
failing credit, the entire financial structure of the state might be
weakened."
The soundness of this distinction between appropriation and extension of
credit based on the proposition that the financial structure of the state is
not threatened to the same extent when a local governmental unit appro-
priates funds or property instead of extending credit 2 9 appears open to
question insofar as improvident appropriations may force a municipal
corporation to curtail needed services or to seek credit from other sources
for its own use.
In general, were these constitutional provisions to be read narrowly,
state and local legislatures would be prevented from providing all but the
most traditional of governmental services. According to the plain meaning
of most of the constitutional provisions involved the validity of an appro-
priation or extension of credit does not depend upon the element of a public
purpose, but rather on the nature of the recipient. However, since a strict
construction of the prohibitive amendments would make difficult or im-
possible municipal participation in such now ubiquitous local projects
as slum clearance, low cost housing, industrial development and parking
facilities, wherein municipal funds are appropriated to private individuals
and corporations and used in providing facilities for a relatively small class
of persons, it is not surprising that the courts have been willing to carve
2 But see MASS. CoNsT. art. XLVI, § 2. See also Opinion of the Justices, 152
N.E.2d 90 (Mass. 1958).
26 Ibid.
2 7 N.Y. CONST. art. 8, § 1. "No county, city, town, village or school district
shall give or loan any money or property to or in aid of any individual, or private
corporation or association, or private undertaking . . . nor shall any county, city,
town, village or school district give or loan its credit to or in aid of any individual,
or public or private corportion or association . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
28280 N.Y. 469, 477-78, 21 N.E.2d 681, 685 (1939).
29 See Comereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955).
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out numerous exceptions in deference to expanding societal needs. The
following sections will explore what remains of the constitutional restric-
tions.
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court has indicated that the states have broad discretion
in determining what type of activity serves a public purpose. Thus in
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.,30 where a state unemployment
compensation act was challenged as constituting a denial of fourteenth
amendment due process the Court said, "the existence of local conditions
[is] peculiarly within the knowledge of the legislature . . . and
it would require a plain case of departure from every public purpose which
could reasonably be conceived to justify the intervention of a court." 31
From this broad proposition it is apparent that an act of a state legislature,
valid under the liberal federal constitutional standard of due process, may
yet be such as to fall afoul of the more restrictive state constitutional
provisions here under consideration.
The validity of legislative projects involving appropriations and ex-
tension of credit has been supported in the states on five general grounds
based on judicial interpretation of the local constitutional provisions.3 2
(1) The governmental entity which is lending credit, expending funds
or becoming a shareholder in a corporation is not included among the
enumerated entities prohibited from engaging in such activity.
(2) The private entity which is receiving the funds or credit is not
among the enumerated entities to which such credit or property may not
be given.
(3) The appropriation was not in the form of a prohibited donation.
(4) The extension of credit was not made in an improper manner.
(5) The transaction was not within the policy of the constitutional
restriction.
An examination of the operation of these doctrines gives some insight
into the manner in which the courts interpret the state constitutions and
reveals a number of unsolved problems.
Entity Performing Act Is Not Within the Constitutional Proscription
When a particular activity is engaged in by an entity established by
a municipality, or when the municipality participates in an activity of
30 301 U.S. 495 (1937). See also Hacket v. Ottawa, 99 U.S. 86 (1878).
31301 U.S. at 514-15. See also Craig v. North Mississippi Community Hosp.,
206 Miss. 11, 41, 39 So. 2d 523, 529 (1949) : "The only limitation [on the legislature]
. . . under due process being that the means chosen must not be so far beyond the
necessity of the case as to be an arbitrary exercise of governmental power." See also
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 6 (1946).
32 See 15 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 39.26 (3d ed. 1950) for a
general statement of the law in this area.
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another entity, it must be determined whether the constitutional prohibitions
apply. In Bolen v. Board of Firemen'3 a pension fund was established by
the city for the police and firemen. The board administering the fund was
composed of the mayor, councilmen and the city treasurer. The board had
authority under the terms of the instrument setting up the fund to invest
surplus funds in investment trust shares which represented interests in
private corporations, though the city itself would be prohibited from so
doing under the state constitution.Y The court held that once the city
made payments to the pension fund as a form of compensation to city
employees for services rendered, the money became the property of the
fund and not the city. The pension board was distinguished from a political
corporation subject to the constitutional restrictions on the ground that it
lacked the attributes of geographic area and boundaries, public elections,
public officials, taxing power and a general public purpose.
Faced with a similar problem, an Alabama court distinguished a
nonprofit municipal development corporation from the local municipality.3
The corporation was established by the city under a state statute which
required city approval of the certificate of incorporation and city appoint-
ment of the board of directors. The corporation was authorized to float
revenue bonds and expend funds to finance new industry in local areas
through such projects as the construction of factory buildings. In spite of
the possibility of control exercised over the development corporation by the
city through appointment of the board of directors and approval of the
certificate, the municipality and the corporation were deemed not identical.
The court considered as the crucial distinguishing factor that the develop-
ment corporation, though established by the city, issued its own bonds
which did not by law constitute the debt of the city.
And in Illinois, a distinction has been recognized between the city and
a local housing authority established by the city under a state statute,
because the funds and property held by the authority were said to belong
to the state and not the city. The board of the local authority was ap-
pointed by the municipality, and once established it was endowed with all
powers necessary and appropriate to engage in low-rent housing and slum
clearance projects. The local authority could acquire funds for its opera-
tion only by the sale of bonds, by gift, or grant from federal, state or
municipal governments. In spite of this extensive local autonomy the
housing authority was viewed as a state agency and not an agency of the
municipality.36
These decisions suggest that in determining whether an act should be
attributed to a municipality when performed by another entity, the factor
considered most significant is the financial relationship between the munic-
ipality and the entity in question. Because these courts do not analyze the
33308 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1957).
4 TEx. CoNsT. art. 3, § 52.
35 Opinion of the Justices, 254 Ala. 506, 49 So. 2d 175 (1950).
36 Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948).
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relationship in terms of the locus and exercise of decision making control,
it is possible for a municipality to establish a financially independent entity
and engage indirectly in activities which it is prohibited from carrying on
directly. Justification for such a result may perhaps be found in the con-
sideration that one primary evil aimed at by the prohibitory amendments,
the disbursal of public revenues for particular advantage, can often be
minimized by the complete fiscal separation of city and private organization.
Nevertheless insofar as substantial amounts of municipal funds or funds
solicited from the public against municipal credit or by use of the municipal
name do in fact enter the coffers of such organizations, these decisions
would seem to be controlled more by the court's approval of the type of
legislative activity than by strict adherence to the language or the spirit of
the constitution.
Recipient of Property or Credit Not Within the Constitutional Prohibition
In general the type of constitutional provisions under consideration
prohibits aid to a broad class of possible recipients often catalogued as
individuals, associations, public or private corporations or institutions.
Numerous exceptions have been carved out of this kind of broad language.
The nonprofit corporation is an exception frequently mentioned.
Appropriations to such bodies as hospitals and children's homes have been
upheld on the ground that the corporation is under governmental supervi-
sion and in fact serves a public purpose.3 7 Some courts have gone so far
as to express the view that the constitutional prohibition against aid to
corporations applies only to private corporations organized for profit and
not to nonprofit corporations 3 8
Another exception is the subsidiary of the city. This includes such
entities as a sewer district with the function of operating sewage disposal
facilities in a metropolitan area 39 and a metropolitan gas district.40  By
this device a city is allowed to incur indebtedness or extend credit for the
purpose of providing such traditional necessities of an urban community as
water, light, gas and sewage facilities, even though the recipient entities have
powers independent of the city.
41
The concept of a public corporation (often called an "authority") is
closely related to that of a subsidiary agency of the city. Typically a public
37 People v. Cain, 410 Ill. 39, 101 N.E.2d 74 (1951) (a hospital); Hager v.
Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904) (a children's
home). Note that the court does consider the power and control relationship between
the municipality and the entity for the purpose of upholding a municipal activity, but
does not consider this element when it would serve to invalidate the activity. See
text following note 36 mpra.
38 Opinion of the Justices, 263 Ala. 174, 81 So. 2d 699 (1955) ; Cremer v. Peoria
Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 579, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948); Walniske v. Detroit-Wayne
joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W.2d 73 (1949).
39 Johnson v. City of Louisville, 261 S.W.2d 429 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
40 City of Andalusia v. Southeast Ala. Gas Dist., 261 Ala. 297, 74 So. 2d 479
(1954).
41 See Hillard v. City of Mobile, 253 Ala. 676, 47 So. 2d 162 (1950).
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corporation is established by a municipality under the authority of a state
statute to fulfill the more modern needs of the urban community. This de-
vice has been used for such purposes as slum clearance and urban redevelop-
ment,4 building and operation of public parking facilities," and maintenance
and operation of port facilities."4 In general courts uphold municipal
appropriations to such public corporations whenever they are engaging in
types of activity which the court finds that the municipality could perform
directly. The theory most often articulated to sustain city financial par-
ticipation in such institutions-that they are quasi-governmental in nature
-is not without elements of inconsistency. A public corporation of this
type is authorized to issue bonds and incur debts to finance its particular
project.45 For the purpose of determining if a municipality has exceeded
its constitutional debt limit the obligations of the authority are not con-
sidered to be debts of the municipality but rather debts of an independent
fiscal entity.4 6 However, for the purpose of receiving aid by a municipality
the authority is deemed a quasi-municipal entity. This seemingly self-
contradictory reasoning of course yields its social rewards in that it allows
a city to perform important functions within the constitutional debt limit
while leaving it free to operate through an authority in manners otherwise
prohibited to the city; 47 the judicial inclination to permit a growing role
to municipal government in spite of the restrictive language of the state
constitutions here appears evident. Through the use of concepts like
subsidiary of the city, nonprofit corporation or public corporation the
judiciary has exercised broad discretion in determining whether a particular
project is within the proper role of municipal government, avoiding plain
constitutional meaning and shifting the inquiry to consideration of whether
the recipient is engaged in a public purpose.
Form of the Donation
Several doctrines have evolved from the attempt to distinguish an
improper grant, donation or extension of credit from a type of act of the
municipality which does not violate the constitutional prohibition.
Clearly a municipality may appropriate funds when it receives in
return goods or services which are used for municipal purposes. 48 Such a
transaction is not considered a donation but is simply the normal business
4 2 Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 277 (1947);
Ferch v. Housing Authority, 79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849 (1953).
43 Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954); Co-
mereski v. City of Elmira, 308 N.Y. 248, 125 N.E.2d 241 (1955); McSorley v. Fitz-
gerald, 359 Pa. 264, 59 A.2d 142 (1948).
44 City of Camden v. South Jersey Port Comm'n, 4 NJ. 357, 73 A.2d 55 (1950).
45 See Shestack, The Public Authority, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 553 (1957).
46 Id. at 557.
47 See Cremer v. Peoria Housing Authority, 399 Ill. 597, 78 N.E.2d 276 (1948).
The authority was authorized to extend mortgage loans to private developers although
the city could not do so directly.
48 "The exchange of one thing for another does not constitute a donation or loan
of the city's credit." Maffit v. City of Decatur, 322 Ill. 82, 93, 152 N.E. 602, 606
(1926).
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of operating municipal government. On this theory it has been held that
a city may appropriate funds to a retirement program for city employees. 49
Payments of lump sums to employees upon retirement are not a donation
to individuals but, for the purpose of determining their constitutional
validity, are said to be part of the agreed compensation for the services of
the employees. Similarly funds expended by a city for the purpose of
removing railroad tracks belonging to a private corporation from a public
street were not considered to be a donation in aid of the private corporation
when in return the railroad corporation agreed to abandon the remainder of
its franchise right to use of the street. Since the street was to be used for
a needed highway the city was said to receive valid consideration for the
appropriation." In contrast, when a city obtained ownership of certain
real property and thus made the property exempt from school taxes, it was
held improper for the city to compensate the school district for the resulting
loss by a direct appropriation. 51 And when a private paving contractor had
agreed to accept the risk of collecting assessment charges from abutting
property owners instead of holding the city liable for street improvements,
it was held improper for the city later to make itself liable to the contractor
for the unpaid assessments.
52
This distinction between a proper and. an improper act based on the
doctrine of consideration may be more readily stated than consistently
applied. An appropriation amounts to a donation when the city neither
receives a benefit nor discharges a legal obligation. But a particular type
of benefit received by the municipality may be a proper object of appropria-
tion in one jurisdiction and not in another. In Wisconsin, for example,
municipal appropriations to industrial corporations for the purpose of
promoting industrial growth have been held improper. 53 The court has
further stated that a sale of real estate to an industrial corporation for such
a purpose at considerably less than the fair market value would be improper
as a donation. 54  In other jurisdictions, however, the promotion of indus-
49 McNichols v. City & County of Denver, 131 Colo. 246, 280 P.2d 1096 (1955).
But see Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937).
50 Boyce v. City of Gastonia, 227 N.C. 139, 41 S.E.2d 355 (1947).
51 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Board of Trustees, 204 S.W.2d 22
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1947).
62 "It would be intolerable if any legislative body, municipal, state or national,
were to be allowed to make a grant to individuals of public funds in the absence of any
legal, equitable or moral right thereto. Nor can the legislature, under the guise of a
moral obligation enact such legislation if it is abundantly clear that no such obligation
exists." Harbold v. City of Reading, 355 Pa. 253, 265, 49 A.2d 817, 824 (1946).
53 "The law is well established in this state that a city or village may not make
a gift of municipal property to an industrial corporation for the purpose of aiding the
industrial growth of the community." Hermann v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 537,
541, 82 N.W.2d 167, 170 (1957). See also City of Kiel v. Frank Shoe Mfg. Co., 240
Wis. 594, 4 N.W.2d 117 (1942) (city-owned building to be used free of rent and taxes
for five years); Wendlandt v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 222 Wis. 204, 268 N.W.
230 (1936) (city provided a bonus and a free water supply).
54 Herman v. City of Lake Mills, 275 Wis. 537, 82 N.W.2d 167 (1957). "A
transfer of municipal property to a manufacturing corporation in return for a payment
representing only part of the fair market value of the property, which is knowingly
made for the purpose of promoting industrial expansion, is .. . beyond the power of
the municipality." Id. at 542, 82 N.W.2d at 170.
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trial growth would be considered a valid purpose of municipal appropriation
or extension of credit.55 And in contrast to the Wisconsin dictum con-
cerning a sale of land for industrial development at less than fair market
value, there are a number of cases in which land was sold to a private
developer for the purpose of eliminating blighted areas. The land was sold
at an artificially fixed use value determined by the local authority and
representing the value at which the land ought to be made available to the
developer in order to assure a fair return on his investment from a low-
rental housing project-a price which might be less than the cost to the
city of acquiring the land and clearing the site. Such a transaction was not
considered to be an appropriation for the benefit of the purchasers of the
land, on the theory that the land was to be sold or leased on condition that
the property be developed or redeveloped for purposes specified in the
redevelopment plan, a condition which continued the public use after the
property was transferred to private persons.5 6 Thus in People v. City of
Chicago,57 consideration to the city was found in the sale of land to a
developer at a use value under the Blighted Area Act,58 by reason of the
developer's agreeing to undertake the program and to comply with the city
requirements. It seems that the basic distinction between the purchase
of land by a private industrial corporation for industrial development at
less than the fair market value, and the purchase of land by a private
developer for housing redevelopment at an artificially set price (which need
not be at a fair market value) is that the court considers the ultimate
purpose of the activity involved to be proper in the latter and not in the
former situation. In the absence of a specific statutory standard 59 or of
controlling precedents, the courts appear to exercise wide discretion in
applying a public purpose test to determine if a city has received adequate
consideration or has in fact made an improper donation.
In addition to the doctrine of receipt of consideration, courts apply
other analyses related to the form of donation to justify acts of the munic-
ipality which might well seem to violate the strict language of the constitu-
tional proscriptions. Though these provisions frequently prohibit munic-
ipalities from becoming stockholders in any association or corporation, it
is well established that they may insure their property with a mutual in-
surance company.60 This result has been reached both on the technical
ground that a purchaser of a mutual insurance policy does not have the
incidents of ownership and is therefore not a stockholder of the company
55 See McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1958).
56 See, e.g., Velinshka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571 (1954).
57 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
5 8 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67Y2, §§ 63-91 (Supp. 1958).
59 1n Fraser v. Township of Teaneck, 137 N.J.L. 119, 58 A.2d 610 (Sup. Ct.
1948), a statute provided a standard for determining if a public purpose justified the
exchange of land of the city for land to be used for public parks.
60 See Louisville Bd. of Ins. v. Board of Education, 309 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. Ct. App.
1957), and cases cited therein.
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within the meaning of the constitution,1 and on the less precise policy
concept that the constitution is not violated insofar as there is no diversion
of tax revenue from normal governmental channels. The latter line of
reasoning appears to be another way of expressing the conclusion that the
funds are used for a public purpose, and thus again would constitute an
instance of the type of broad exception to the constitutional prohibitions
which permits a court to validate municipal activities on the basis of its own
standards of propriety.
A more substantial theory has been used to validate municipal appro-
priations for purposes beyond the traditional scope of municipal govern-
ment: -that there is no merging of public and private capital. This
doctrine was expressed in an early case which upheld a city appropriation
to a private citizens' committee to study the feasibility of a public ship
canal.6 It has been reiterated in more recent cases when, for example,
the municipality is involved in operating a commercial enterprise. In
Wilmington Parking Authority v. Ranken, 4 a city appropriation in aid of
a municipal parking authority successfully resisted attack on the ground
that the authority in operating a parking project planned to lease certain
space to commercial enterprise. The leasing of property to private interests
for a profit was deemed essential to the financial success of the project and
the project was considered proper in this regard because there was no
union of public and private capital in the enterprise.65 Conversely, an
improper commingling of public and private property was said to occur
when a village contracted to purchase a generator from a manufacturer on
a sixty-month installment contract. Inasmuch as title would not pass until
the payments were completed, the city would be exposed to the hazards of
enforcing its rights against the rights of creditors.86
When title to property is in the city, however, courts have upheld
expenditures involving a mingling of public and private capital. In Kittel
v. City of Cincinnati,'T a plan in which the city was to purchase transporta-
tion facilities from a private company for the purpose of rehabilitating them
and allowing the company to operate them was upheld. The company
agreed to contribute to the cost of repair, to pay taxes and insurance on the
property and to maintain and repair the facilities. This case was dis-
01 Ibid.
6 Municipal Housing Comm'n v. Public Housing Administration, 261 S.W2d
286 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
63 In commenting on the constitutional prohibition, the court said, "The mischief
which this section interdicts is a business partnership between a municipal or sub-
ordinate division of the state, and individuals or private corporations or associations.
It forbids the union of public or private capital or credit in any enterprise whatever."
Commonwealth ex rel. Kelly v. City of Pittsburg, 183 Pa. 202, 206, 38 Atl. 628, 629-30
(1897).
04 105 A.2d 614 (Del. 1954).
05 However, the project was declared invalid on the ground that the statutory
requirements of competitive bidding had not been met.
106 Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 190 N.E. 766 (1934).
67 78 Ohio App. 251, 69 N.E.2d 771 (1946).
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tinguished from an earlier one" 8 in which it was held an improper loan
of the city's money and credit to expend money to Tenew or repair the
tracks of a street railway company where upon completion title to the
repaired property would remain in the company. The effect of Kittel is
that tax funds may be used indirectly to aid a private profitmaking corpo-
ration which can be related to a public purpose, so long as the city becomes
the owner of the physical plant. The purchase of the property is said not to
violate the prohibition against a municipality's becoming a stockholder in
any corporation because the enterprise may be characterized as a municipal
enterprise and not a private business venture.0 9 And once the physical
plant comes under city ownership, the city may make capital improvements
without violating the constitutional prohibition against aiding corporations.
The cases thus indicate that though the courts may talk in terms of the
nature of consideration, the merging of funds or the ownership of property,
the underlying factor in evaluating the form of the aid is public purpose.
When the activity of the municipality seems to satisfy the court's concepts of
public purpose it will be upheld with but minimal lip service to the language
of the constitution.
Extension of Credit Was Made in a Proper Manner
In recent years many communities have sought to improve economic
conditions in their locality by encouraging private industry to move into the
area.70 As inducements to industrial development communities have pur-
chased or built industrial facilities and have offered to lease them to private
industry at attractive rates. When such projects have been financed out
of ordinary municipal bonds issued on the credit of the city and secured by
the power to tax they have been declared to be in violation of the constitu-
tion; it has been considered improper to impose taxation for the purpose of
"establishing, aiding, or maintaining private business enterprises whose
sole object is the private emolument of the proprietors, no matter how
beneficial to the community such enterprises may be." 71 To avoid this
objection that private industry was being financed out of public funds,
communities have financed industrial development projects through the
68 City of Cincinnati v. Harth, 101 Ohio St. 344, 128 N.E. 263 (1920). Accord,
Murphy v. Dever, 320 Ill. 186, 150 N.E. 663 (1926), which held that it was improper
for a city to provide funds to eliminate a railroad grade crossing since it was con-
sidered to be an improvement to private property, in spite of the public interest involved.
But see Brooke v. City of Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 29 Atl. 387 (1894), which held
that an elimination of a railroad grade crossing was a proper public purpose for the
expenditure of city funds in spite of the constitutional prohibition.
09 See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW 342 (1957): "Although subscriptions to stock
are forbidden, municipalities have been permitted to buy stock preliminary to the
acquisition of the physical properties."
70 See Note, Incentives to Industrial Relocation: The Municipal Industrial Bond
Plans, 66 HARV. L. REv. 898 (1953); Note, Municipal Inducements to Private In-
dustry, 40 MINK. L. Rzv. 681 (1956).
*71 Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 96, 275 S.W. 29, 31 (1925). Accord, Brumby
v. City of Clearwater, 108 Fla. 633, 149 So. 203 (1933); New York Cent. R.R. v.
City of Bucyrus, 126 Ohio St. 558, 186 N.E. 450 (1933). See also Town of Belleair
v. Olds, 127 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1942).
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issuance of revenue bonds. Such bonds are issued in the name of the
municipality but are not general obligations of the municipality, being pay-
able only out of the revenue received from the operation of the project
involved. When the issuance of such bonds has been authorized by state
statutes most courts have upheld their validity on the theory that the credit
of the municipality was not involved.72
But there has been by no means universal accord among the courts in.
recognizing a distinction between projects financed by revenue bonds and
those financed by municipal bonds. In State ex rel. Beck v. City of York,78
it was held that the state constitutional provision that the credit of the state
shall never be given or loaned in aid of any individual, association or corpo-
ration prevented a city from issuing revenue bonds for the purpose of
industrial development. Recognizing that the revenue bonds did not
represent a general obligation of the city, the court nevertheless observed
that the city had taken on such private administrative burdens in aid of
private industry as fixing and collecting rentals, executing leases, taking
mortgages on equipment to secure rents, and paying of insurance. These
administrative duties were as much improper aid to private industry as the
issuance of municipal bonds for industrial development would be. In
addition, even though the bonds which were issued were revenue bonds and
were but limited obligations of the city, the fact that the name of the city
had been used on them might lead investors to believe that they were
unqualified municipal obligations and that the city would make payments
on the bonds from tax sources if insufficient revenue was received from
the operation of the project. The loan of its name by a city to bring about
benefit to a private project, even where no general liability of the city was
involved, was said to be nothing short of a loan of the credit of the city.
Similar views were expressed in the dissent to Village of Deming v.
Hosdreg Co.74
The basic issue which separates the City of York view from those of
courts which allow industrial development projects when financed out of
revenue bonds is whether it is proper for a governmental entity to become in
any way involved in promoting private enterprise. Those courts which
uphold revenue bonds as a method of financing are in effect saying that a
community may encourage industrial development if there is no direct
investment of public capital; the City of York view is that any expenditure
of public funds for the purpose of promoting private industry is beyond the
scope of the city's power.. That the basic difference between the two views
may be reduced to differing attitudes toward public purpose is indicated
by the statement in City of York that a "general benefit to the economy of
a community does not justify the use of public funds of the city unless it be
7 2 N ewberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952) ; Faulconer
v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950); Village of Deming v.
Hosdreg Co., 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956) ; Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193
Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
73 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
-4 62 N.M. 18, 35, 303 P.2d 920, 931 (1956).
110 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
for a public as distinguished from a private purpose." 75 Indeed it is
apparent that in City of York the court invalidated the proposed issuance
of revenue bonds for industrial development and rejected the distinction
between revenue and ordinary bonds by reason of its concept of a public
purpose. In direct opposition to City of York, further suggesting the
extreme flexibility of the public purpose notion, stands McConnell v. City
of Lebanon,76 in which the court rejected the revenue bond distinction and
upheld the validity of an issuance of bonds on the credit of the city for
industrial development because it was found that the industrial development
was for a public purpose. The significance of this result may be appreciated
by recalling the arguments which were earlier used to invalidate extension
of city credit to the railroads and which ultimately resulted in the adoption
of the state constitutional proscriptions:
"When we have once determined that a municipal government can
tax its citizens to make a donation to a railroad company . . .we
do not go a single step farther when we hold that it may use the public
funds to erect a cotton or woolen factory, or a building suited to the
manufacture of tobacco, and present it on grounds of public benefit to
any person who will occupy it." 77
If the McConnell view is accepted as a reasonable result in light of the
social and economic changes which have occurred since the adoption of the
constitutional amendments, can it be said that any vitality remains in the
prohibitions of aid or extension of credit to private corporations? A court
today relying solely on the public purpose concept to determine if an ex-
tension of credit is proper seems committed to the same philosophy that
dominated pre-amendment courts. While the constitutional provisions of
course represent a potentially severe limitation upon municipal legislative
discretion and thus present an effective instrument -to courts inclined to
invalidate municipal expenditures for other than the traditional police
functions of government, the number of courts in fact so inclined appears
relatively insignificant.
Transaction Is Not Within the Policy of the Constitutional Restriction
A final theory for upholding the validity of a municipal action is the
general one that the policy of the constitutional prohibition was not intended
75 164 Neb. 223, 230, 82 N.W.2d 269, 274 (1957).
76 314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1958).
77 People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v. Township Board, 20 Mich. 452, 489 (1870).
See also Whiting v. Sheboygan & F.L.R.R., 25 Wis. 167, 187 (1870): "For if such
incidental public benefits or advantages alone will support a tax for donation of money
to persons or corporations engaged in one kind of private business, then they certainly
must in another, and if it should be shown . . . that the establishment of mills and
manufactories would be greatly beneficial to the inhabitants, far more so, perhaps
than the building of a railroad, then it would follow that the people of such towns
and places could be taxed for the purpose of giving the money to build such mills
or manufactories. This last is a proposition upon which no one will insist..
(Emphasis added.)
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to apply to the situation. The question of whether the prohibition was
intended to apply is in reality the basic inquiry whenever municipal action
in this area is questioned and it pervades all the decisions, although, for this
very reason, it is rarely given as the sole ground for a holding. When the
theory is invoked it frequently proceeds from the limited proposition that
the amendment was "designed to prohibit governmental grants to rail-
roads" 78 and concludes that "the basic test is whether the municipal action
under attack may fairly be characterized as a public one." 79 One peculiar
result of this approach is to view with suspicion any expenditure which will
result in a benefit to a railroad even though the action may be characterized
as being in the public interest.80 Thus to limit the application of the con-
stitutional prohibition to financial relations with railroads, however, seems
justified neither by the language of the provisions themselves nor by the
arguments adduced at the time of their adoption."'
THE CONFLICT TODAY
The dominant principle which emerges from the cases, then, is that
judicial interpretation has largely returned to public purpose as the touch-
stone of analysis and that to a great extent the constitutional provisions have
been supplanted. This has occurred even though the institution of the
provisions was precipitated by the very fact that the public purpose doctrine
alone gave inadequate protection against abuses.8 Furthermore, in dealing
with public purpose questions under the constitutions, courts operate from
a presumption that legislative enactments are based on a finding of a public
purpose, and judges will not interfere with such a legislative determination
unless they find an abuse of legislative discretion-a purpose without any
discoverable rational relation to public interest or welfare and unquestion-
ably beyond the scope of modern government.83 The effect of this presump-
tion and of the impossibility of defining public purpose with certainty is
that a court may be led to find that a particular municipal activity fulfills
the requirements of a public purpose without considering the actual effect
78 Hoglund v. City of Summit, 28 N.J. 540, 548, 147 A.2d 521, 526 (1959). Note
that the New Jersey constitution does not expressly mention aid to railroad com-
panies, but prohibits aid in general terms to any "individual, association, or corpo-
ration." N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § III.
19 Hoglund v. City of Summit, supra note 78, at 548, 147 A.2d at 526. See also
Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 119 Ky. 235, 83 S.W. 605 (1904).
SOBut see Brooke v. City of Philadelphia, 162 Pa. 123, 29 Atl. 387 (1894).
81 See note 17 sopra and accompanying text.
82Hager v. Kentucky Children's Home Soc'y, 119 Ky. 235, 246, 83 S.W. 605,
608 (1904): "The vital point in all such appropriations is whether the purpose is
public; and that if it is, it does not matter whether the agency through which it is
dispersed is public or not; . . . the test is in the end; not in the means." In State v.
Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 89 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1956), the
court held that an undertaking was for a public purpose even though some private
parties were incidentally benefited, stating that aid to an individual would not be
proper if the incidental public purpose was too inconsequential in comparison to the
private gain.
83 See Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39
N.W.2d 73 (1949).
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-of the activity on the community. Absence of reliable objective criteria of
public purpose often causes the validity of a particular project to depend
upon the social and economic views of the particular court concerned;
legislatures are given no assurance that a given project will be upheld when
the court's view of the project is at variance with that of the legislature.
RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
A tenable argument may be made that today there is little need for
the protection afforded by the prohibitive amendments and that at best
these provisions serve only to impede the increasingly dynamic role of local
government in modern society. The argument is based on the theory that
the constitutional proscriptions were enacted to solve a highly specialized
type of problem peculiar to the era of railroad expansion and that, the era of
railroad expansion having passed, the government of today should not con-
tinue to be bound by restrictions intended to prevent evils which are no
longer in existence. Under this view the presently prevalent judicial attitude
represents an adequate solution to the problem of municipal expenditures;
the public purpose doctrine by circumventing the constitutional impediments
has enabled local governments to fulfill the needs of the community as they
arise, limited only by the forces of political pressure. An application of
this point of view is found in Hoglnd v. City of Summit:84
"Municipalities have a wide latitude of discretion with respect to public
improvements and . . . the courts will not interfere with the legisla-
tive judgment in the absence of fraud or palpable abuse of discretion
... . Ultimate review of the expediency of the improvement is
generally to be had at the polls."
A contrary suggestion proceeds from the attitude that the evils which
precipitated the constitutional restrictions imposed during the era of rail-
road expansion have not vanished from the current political and economic
scene. Schemes for promotion of private industrial development bear a
remarkable similarity to those early railroad development schemes which so
often proved financially unsound and particularly vulnerable to political
corruption and to exploitation by powerful private interest groups. This
point of view concludes that the judicial doctrine of public purpose as it is
generally applied represents an abandonment of the safeguards to which
local taxpayers are entitled under the state constitutions.
Each of these positions appears to overlook the valid portions of the
other. It is unlikely that local governments will ever so develop that there
remains no minimal risk of self-seeking particular interest or excess of
enthusiasm carrying through an improper or economically unfeasible project
at the public expense. On the other hand, absolute prohibitions well might
block such socio-economic undertakings as low cost housing or slum
8428 N.J. 540, 552, 147 A.2d 521, 528 (1959).
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clearance, currently accepted as legitimate and even necessary municipal
functions. The present judicial treatment of the problem seems to give
inadequate recognition to the interaction of these two opposing pulls.
If it is accepted that some sort of change is desirable there are two
possible lines of approach. The first is constitutional reform: repeal of
the existing type of amendment and enactment of revised provisions which
would reflect contemporary municipal needs and experiences under the
present proscriptions and would incorporate desired safeguards. The
feasibility of this alternative is doubtful not only because of the drafting
problems involved in providing the necessary flexibility but also because of
the practical political problems of amending a constitution. A second ap-
proach places responsibility upon the state legislatures to supply the safe-
guards which were intended to be provided by the current constitutional
provisions. Municipal appropriation or extension of credit must be made
under the authority of state enabling legislation.8 5  The legislature thus
has the opportunity to exercise a preliminary judgment as to the general
types of projects which may be legitimately undertaken. The enabling
legislation might in addition provide for an administrative body which would
consider the specific project according to predetermined standards and
make an objective finding as to whether the project would be economically
feasible.
One state has attempted such a solution. Tennessee in 1955 passed
an Industrial Building Bond Act 86 authorizing local governmental bodies
to engage in industrial development projects financed by the issuance of
bonds supported by their credit and their taxing power. Prior to this
statute, municipalities were limited to financing such projects out of revenue
bonds.87 The statute established a state commission with power to issue
certificates of public purpose and necessity to any municipality making ap-
plication. A subcommittee composed of persons with experience in invest-
ment, finance or industry is required to investigate and to hold hearings
prior to issuing a certificate, and the statute provides that the committee
must find:
"(1) That there are sufficient natural resources readily and economi-
cally available for the use and operation of the particular industrial
building and enterprise for at least ten years, but in no event less than
the period of time for which any bonds may be issued for acquiring
or constructing said industrial building.
"(2) That there is available a labor supply to furnish at least one and
one-half workers for each operative job in said enterprise within an
area of twenty-five miles from the proposed location.
85 See Hancock, Pennsylvania Local Government, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, p. 43
(1957).
86TENN. CODE ANN. §§6-2901-18 (Supp. 1958), upheld as constitutional in
McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 314 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1958).
87 See notes 71, 72 supra and accompanying text.
114 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"(3) That there are adequate property values and suitable financial
conditions, so that the total bonded indebtedness of the municipality,
solely for the purpose authorized by this Act, shall not exceed ten per
cent of the total assessed valuation of all the property in the munic-
ipality. .. " 88
In addition, it must be found that:
"said industrial building and enterprise is well conceived, has a reason-
able prospect of success, will provide proper economic development
and employment, and will not become a burden upon the taxpayers of
the municipality." 89
Further safeguards are provided in the statute: the certificate specifies the
nature and extent of the project which the city may engage in and the
type of indebtedness which the city may incur; 0 the entire proposal must
receive the approval of the voters in a municipal election.9 '
This type of statute has certain definite advantages. The use of a
state administrative body to review projects proposed by municipalities
affords safeguards to local taxpayers which are not available by judicial
review. The expert body of commissioners is better suited by traditional
role, better equipped by structure and better fitted by experience to deter-
mine the economic feasibility of a project-its wisdom as distinguished
from its constitutional legitimacy-than is a regular judicial tribunal. That
the determination of public purpose itself is in any case a legislative rather
than a judicial function is indicated by the reluctance of the courts to con-
sider the factual elements of specific project situations and the judicial
substitution, in lieu of searching socio-economic appraisal, of a presumption
of validity rebuttable only upon convincing evidence of legislative abuse. But
whereas the contemporary judicial approach is to invalidate a municipal
project only when the absence of a public purpose is clear and palpable,9
and therefore to avoid examining such projects in terms of the direction of
their immediate impact or their practical soundness, m the drafters of the
Tennessee type of statute insist that when the public purpose doctrine is
to be invoked as restricting municipal activities in this area there should
be some more substantial investigation of the particular fact situation of a
proposed project than that which results from the application of a judicial
8 STENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2906 (Supp. 1958).
69 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
9' TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2907 (Supp. 1958).
92 People ex rel. Thompson v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 397 Ill. 319, 74 N.E2d 510
(1947).
93 "The courts will find that a public purpose exists upon a determination that
the objects sought are needed by all or a large number of the public, cannot be supplied
by private enterprise but only through the united efforts under unified control, will
benefit primarily the whole of society, and are in line with the historical develoDment
of the community." RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 69, at 343-44.
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presumption. Thus the broader scope of this type of statute will both
provide protection against exploitative private interests similar to that
originally intended by the state constitutions and inaugurate a scheme of
administrative checks to assure the economic soundness of project con-
ception, and yet will allow state and local governments to meet the needs
of a changing urban society. Legislatures which desire to authorize munic-
ipalities to deal with current social and economic problems within the
expanding notion of the proper function of government should nevertheless
recall the warning of Justice Cooley in People ex rel. Detroit & H.R.R. v.
Township Board: 9
"When the state once enters upon the business of subsidies, we shall
not fail to discover that the strong and powerful interests are those
most likely to control legislation, and that the weaker will be taxed to
enhance the profits of the stronger."
While freedom to develop is a necessary condition of modern municipal
government, safeguards commensurate with the risks inherent in that
freedom must be provided.
R.M.S.
9420 Mich. 452, 487 (1870).
